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Miranda Intel.
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Intelligence

Information contained within these pages can be accessed by links from the diary which will provide reference (hyper-links) to the documents as they become relevant.

It will not be possible to detail all aspects of the information I submitted or handled whilst a member of the Narcotics department but where this is possible, reports will be posted.

In essence the reports concentrate on three main areas; Bermuda internal; Bermuda external U.S. and Bermuda External U.K.

Bermuda internal represents the most prolific amount of correspondence.  This includes reports made of suspects based on information received but also includes internal enquiry information; information pertaining to police officers. 

I was often asked to record telephone conversations (having the only device for this purpose).  This included calls between at least one senior Officer, George Jackson and a Barrister.  

The Inspector's office at Hamilton Police station was occasionally the subject of tape recordings and the interview rooms (with their loose tile ceiling) were similarly capable of having a voice activated recorder placed on them to capture for example, client / attorney conversations (not a 'stunt' I ever found myself employing I hasten to add).

The recordings number 15, approximately 30 hours of conversation.

Written intelligence reports are also all held on disks.  I took the opportunity to purchase my own word processor with external disk drive, such was the need for maintaining confidentiality.

Bermuda external U.S. is primarily in relation to the Miranda enquiry.  Antonio Miranda having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment and my statement having been read (entered into evidence), a full copy will be posted.

The Miranda enquiry reaches into the U.S. from where the network supplying Bermuda was controlled.  The information dates back to the early 80's and the deportation from Bermuda of a supplier to South America.  It is said this was the start of the links forged between Bermuda and the U.S. suppliers.  However, logic dictates the 'original' importation was destined for someone and a demand had been identified requiring the supply.

The Miranda enquiry involves many reports from the US to Bermuda not least of all because a murder enquiry followed.

The cocaine suppliers believed they had identified our informant, the person who had caused us to arrest many at the Bermuda end of their network.  The person the suppliers believed to be our informant, Deborah Owens (Newark, New Jersey) was "gunned down on the orders of two Cuban drug kingpins who suspected that she was about to snitch on their lucrative Bermuda operation" read the Mid Ocean news (7th December 1990).

The report was only just wide of the mark.  The Miranda arrests, the seizure of cocaine and cash, had been the subject of an informant, but this was not Miss Owens.

From Deborah Owens' perspective, the information being supplied by a Bermudan was very badly timed.

Coincidentally, as Miss Owens was making her veiled threats (apparently because she was owed $2,000 from a supply run), so the Bermudan 'informant' was speaking to police about the network. 

The alleged 'kingpins' naturally put two and two together; Miss Owens was making threats and the Bermudan end of the network was being ravaged, her murder followed.   Following further arrests, we were to learn (or at least we were supplied an account of) who was responsible.  However, at the commencement of our enquiry and whilst conducting the original arrests, Miss Owens meant nothing to us, we had not heard of her.

In the meantime, the Bermudan informant remained anonymous.  To this day the informants identity is known to but 2 or 3 of us.

The Bermudan informant had talked to the narcotics department before, but the immediately launched operation (under the name 'flogger') failed to locate the subjects at an apartment (there were the usual rumours someone tipped our targets off).  All that was seized were the contents of a bin.  The scraps of paper found were pieced together and found to be a chart detailing nick-names apparently of those to whom cocaine was being distributed and the amount of cash they were to collect from sales.  The figures ran into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Bermuda external U.K. is potentially the most damaging from the police perspective.

In 1989 I came across information concerning the importation of heroin into Bermuda from the U.K.  Intending to pursue this when in England, I attended New Scotland Yard and met with the National Drugs Intelligence Unit.  Bermuda knew of this (see 900319COP) but appeared to ignore, or failed to appreciate the significance.

I subsequently corresponded with a detective sergeant and supplied intelligence following receipt of a letter (which I cite in support of this being a factual account) part of which read:

I do have some interesting intelligence for you and it would be very useful if you could supply a fax number.  The object being for me to transmit my correspondence when you will definitely be standing by the receiving fax machine.

There was an obvious concern and whilst three of the four names meant little to me, the fourth I could identify.  The person named was a relative of a serving officer.

Subsequently, without the knowledge of any other party in Bermuda, reports were sent to the UK.

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